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Mechanisms that are known to forge political agreement include interpersonal 
influence—the process by which people change their ideas according to others’ 
attitudes—and selection—people’s choice of their discussants according to their 
discussants’ preferences. Using data obtained from a longitudinal survey, we test how 
these two processes contribute to changing vote choices or discussants around the 2014 
European elections in Italy. Results partly confirm findings from the previous literature, 
showing influence and selection effects. Moreover, it is suggested that the family 
contributes crucially in stimulating strategies that result in political agreement. 
Propensities to maintain agreeable discussants over time and to change voting choice 
are boosted by exposure to family members. 
 
Keywords: social influence, homophily, social networks, electoral behavior, Italy 
 
 
Mechanisms of interpersonal influence are attracting widespread interest in sociology, political 
science, and communication studies (Bello & Rolfe, 2014; Christakis & Fowler, 2007, 2008; Fowler, 
Heaney, Nickerson, Padgett, & Sinclair, 2011; Guidetti, Cavazza, & Graziani, 2016; Klofstad, 2007; Lazer, 
2011; Rogowski & Sinclair, 2012). Interpersonal communication has been demonstrated to be a crucial 
element in contemporary democracies, affecting both the stability of and changes in individuals’ voting 
behavior. According to the so-called social logic of politics, voting can be seen as a social activity in which, 
by means of interpersonal communication with coworkers, relatives, and friends, citizens structure their 
political attitudes and preferences (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, & McPhee, 1954; Huckfeldt, Johnson, & Sprague, 
2004; Huckfeldt & Sprague, 1995). 
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Several contributions have stressed the roles of selection and influence in shaping patterns of 
agreement among citizens during election campaigns (Bello & Rolfe, 2014; Klofstad, 2007). Selection can 
be broadly identified as a behavior that discards disagreeable discussants and maintains relationships with 
like-minded people. Influence is the mechanism according to which people and their discussants change 
their ideas, reaching a situation of agreement. Because these are relatively fine-textured mechanisms, 
many studies (Fowler et al., 2011; Lomi, Snijders, Steglich, & Torló, 2011; Mollenhorst, Volker, & Flap, 
2008) have recommended using longitudinal data to consider influence and selection patterns. Using four-
wave panel data collected during the 2010 UK elections, for instance, Bello and Rolfe (2014) found that if 
influence actually represents a relevant outcome of a dyadic relation during an election campaign, there is 
much less empirical evidence for selection. Using data from the pre- and postelection Italian National 
Election Studies (ITANES) longitudinal survey collected during the 2014 European elections in Italy, our 
study tests whether Italians’ electoral behaviors are conditioned by influence and/or selection strategies. 
Choosing Italy as our case study allows us to test expectations in the context of interpersonal influence 
and its effects on political behavior, which have been poorly considered in general in the literature. 
Political network studies, indeed, have mainly developed expectations using Anglo-American data (Bello & 
Rolfe, 2014; Huckfeldt & Sprague, 1995; Klofstad, 2007), with a handful of exceptions (Eveland, Song, & 
Beck, 2015; Faas & Schmitt-Beck, 2010; Hopmann, 2012; Hopmann, Matthes, & Nir, 2015; Huckfeldt, 
Ikeda, & Pappi, 2005; Mancosu, 2016; Vezzoni & Mancosu, 2016). Focusing on the Italian case, however, 
means not only extending the literature by adding evidence of an additional, generic case study; we will 
argue that Italy presents a demographic or cultural regime that is typical of Mediterranean countries and 
represents a paradigm of the so-called strong family ties setting (Guetto, Mancosu, Scherer, & Torricelli, 
2016; Hajnal, 1982; Reher, 1998). It will be argued that this demographic/cultural setting presents 
expectations that slightly differ from the Northern European, Central European, and American contexts. 
 
From the methodological side, the study employs variables that have been rarely employed in the 
literature. Because the main predictor of influence processes is the level of disagreement in one’s 
discussion network, this study tests this mechanism by using overall self-reported measures of political 
heterogeneity in different social circles, such as among family and friends (Baldassarri, 2009; Guidetti et 
al., 2016; Mancosu, 2016). Throughout the article, we argue that such a measure is more efficient in 
disentangling network mechanisms than the variables used in previous studies. 
 
Finally, the article controls for design-related biases that could affect our investigation of 
influence and selection effects. The pre- and postelection design employed in this study is known to lead 
to the misreporting of vote choices. For example, bandwagon effects can affect the relevance and 
statistical significance of other, theoretically relevant variables (Atkeson, 1999; Carsey & Jackson, 2001; 
Noelle-Neumann, 1984; Schadee, Segatti, & Bellucci, 2010). This is particularly true for results of the 
2014 European elections in Italy, in which the Italian Democratic Party won with a surprisingly high share 
of votes. Therefore, in addition, this work purifies models from these possible cognitive biases.  
 
Results suggest that influence and positive selection effects are present. Moreover, it is argued 
that familial circles contribute crucially and apparently more than they do in other countries to the 
stimulating strategies that result in political agreement. 
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The next section explores the theoretical literature on influence and selection, stating explicitly 
the working hypotheses. The third and fourth sections present the data, some of their main 
characteristics, and the models that are employed in the hypothesis-testing procedures. The fifth section 
presents the results, and the last summarizes theoretically relevant results, presenting the limitations of 
the work and possible theoretical and empirical solutions. 
 
Background: Selection and Influence 
 
The next two subsections outline the several ways that selection and influence act in changing 
patterns of agreement and disagreement. Similar to other studies (Partheymüller & Schmitt-Beck, 2012), 
the patterns to be tested will be seen only within short time periods (an election campaign or, in this case, 
a few weeks before and after election day); consequently, a large proportion of the interpersonal 
relationships that we measure in these small periods are stable relationships. Part of these stable 
situations, in addition, could be the result of influence and selection processes that occur before the 
observational window. In any case, a sufficiently large number of changes in the data considered can be 
observed (see Appendix A for descriptive results), particularly in times when attention toward politics is 
high, such as the days before and after an election. 
 
The case study for our hypothesis testing is the European election of 2014 in Italy. Italy 
represents a particularly interesting case for the political network literature. With a demographic/cultural 
setting that is typical of Mediterranean countries, Italy represents a paradigm of specific patterns of social 
exchange and cultural and social norms that are radically different than Anglo-American ones, particularly 
with regard to differences in the role of family ties (Guetto et al., 2016; Hajnal, 1982). Reher (1998) 
states: 
 
It is not difficult to identify areas where families and family ties are relatively “strong,” 
and others where they are relatively “weak.” There are regions where traditionally the 
family group has had priority over the individual, and others where the individual and 
individual values have had priority over everything else. (p. 203) 
 
Reher’s classification subdivides the “center and north of Europe (Scandinavia, the British Isles, 
the Low Countries, much of Germany and Austria), together with North American society, . . . 
characterized by relatively weak family links, and the Mediterranean region, [characterized by] by strong 
family ties” (Reher, 1998, p. 203). Maintaining consistency with this view, it has been demonstrated that 
Italians (and Southern Europeans in general) tend to rely more on family ties in various aspects of their 
lives—for instance, when addressing economic issues (Albertini, Kohli, & Vogel, 2007) or when dealing 
with behaviors related to the construction of new families (Schröder, 2008). Our main expectation is that 
even in political relationships, the role of the family shapes patterns of political agreement and 
disagreement. 
 
Mainly because of the lack of data, Mediterranean countries have been rarely considered when 
testing political influence and selection mechanisms. The Italian context, thus, becomes an interesting 
case study because for the first time, we have the opportunity to systematically test interpersonal 
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communication mechanisms in a country that is characterized by the presence of strong family ties. In 
exploring this issue, the study focuses, more than other works do, on outcomes that emerge from 
different strengths of the relationships. Are influence and selection more or less likely to be enacted when 
individuals are engaged with relatives when compared with nonrelatives? Are these differences more 




In the literature of political networks, people are usually seen to be passive recipients of political 
information and pressure. Simply put, people are expected to be affected by others’ behaviors and 
attitudes. Consequently, we can only assess whether external pressure is effective in changing one’s 
behavior (see Berelson et al., 1954). However, several studies (Bello & Rolfe, 2014; Noel & Nyhan, 2011) 
have stressed the active role that people play in selecting their political partners by retaining some of 
them and discarding others. In line with this view, the empirical evidence shows that people do not talk 
with the same discussants all the time, but that, in general, they select discussion partners from those 
who are available (Bello & Rolfe, 2014; Huckfeldt & Sprague, 1995). At least two factors can affect the 
likelihood of retaining (or discarding) a political discussion partner. People might select their discussants 
according to the intimacy they share with others or according to the similarity they share with regard to 
views on politics. From an individual’s perspective, avoiding political talk with someone who holds different 
views is an easy and relatively inexpensive strategy to escape from disagreeable situations (this strategy 
is termed negative selection). The selection process does not usually lead to behaviors that undermine 
relationships tout court; for instance, 
 
Selection of political discussants does not necessarily mean ending pre-existing 
relationships or befriending all Liberal Democrats that one meets; it can be as simple as 
choosing to sit at the opposite end of the table from politically conservative Aunt Edna at 
family gatherings. (Bello & Rolfe, 2014, p. 135) 
 
Consistently, an individual will probably retain like-minded discussants (positive selection). As widely 
recognized in research focusing on political homophily, indeed, people tend to select political messages 
from sources with whom they agree, be they media or interpersonal sources (Zaller, 1992). The following 
hypothesis based on the mechanism revealed: 
 
H1: People are more likely to retain political discussants with whom they agree than with whom they 
disagree. 
 
However, political homophily is not the only reason a person might retain or discard a political 
discussant. The intimacy of the ties that connect people has proven to be a crucial property that 
contributes to the propensity to adopt a selection strategy regardless of the agreement of the two 
discussants (Huckfeldt, Beck, Dalton, & Levine, 1995; Mutz & Mondak, 2006). Intuitively, avoiding political 
talk with an intimate discussant, such as a spouse/partner or a relative, has consequences that are 
dramatically different from avoiding political talk with, say, the mail carrier. It is possible to analytically 
differentiate among different degrees of cohesiveness, which are present in different sections of an ego 
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network (Huckfeldt et al., 1995). Thus, we define cohesive social groups as those in which ties among 
people are more intimate, such as the family (Huckfeldt et al., 1995). Conversely, noncohesive social 
groups are composed of circles of friends or coworkers. In general, it is recognized that in normal 
conditions, people who are part of cohesive social groups are subject to stronger coercive power than 
those who are primarily exposed to noncohesive circles (Faas & Schmitt-Beck, 2010; Mutz & Mondak, 
2006). This pressure can lead to the maintenance of intimate ties regardless of their vote choice. As 
stressed earlier, our expectation regarding this aspect of the selection process is enhanced by the fact that 
we are testing it in Italy, a country where family ties are generally stronger. Thus, we can expect the following: 
 
H2: The likelihood of maintaining a discussant is higher when the discussant is a relative than when 
the discussant is a nonrelative. 
 
As we have established, disagreement enhances negative selection and intimacy discourages it. 
What happens, then, in the case of an intimate and disagreeable relation? We can expect two possible 
outcomes: Disagreement could be noxious even for intimate relationships and could thus lead to a higher 
likelihood of discarding discussants (this outcome could be compatible with the Italian case study, which is 
characterized by strong pressure from the family environment). Conversely, disagreement could increase 
discussions in intimate relationships, leading to a higher likelihood of retaining discussants. This can 
happen when two members of a dyad, particularly because of their intimacy, strive to convince each other 
of their opinion, even if this means arguing over political matters. By analyzing data from the United 
Kingdom, Bello and Rolfe (2014) empirically validated the second alternative. The hypothesis, which is 
based on evidence in the literature, is as follows:  
 
H3: The likelihood of maintaining a discussant is higher when this discussant is a relative and holds 




Influence is the mechanism through which people reach agreement over political matters. Several 
mechanisms can lead to this outcome—for instance, pressure, imitation, or the assimilation of new 
information that changes an individual’s mind (Rolfe, 2009, 2012). We can essentially recognize two 
different types of influence. Influence can be seen as a process by which one of the two people in a dyad 
maintains his or her position and the other one changes his or her opinion toward the first, or, given two 
different attitudes in t0, the two nodes of a dyad reach some sort of intermediate position in t1. It has been 
argued that the propensity to be influenced is a function of the distribution of political opinion in one’s 
discussion network (Bello & Rolfe, 2014). The more the disagreement present in one’s network, the likelier 
the ego is to be pulled toward voting for one party or another (Bello & Rolfe, 2014). The hypothesis, thus, 
is as follows: 
 
H4: An individual will be more likely to change his or her vote choice conditional to disagreement in 
his or her broader network. 
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Moreover, in keeping with previous arguments, we can expect familial networks to provide higher 
levels of political coercion because the relationships are more intimate and the ties are stronger than 
those of nonfamilial (i.e., noncohesive) networks (Huckfeldt et al., 1995; Huckfeldt & Sprague, 1995). If 
disagreement is more difficult to sustain in a familial environment, we can expect attempts to recompose 
an agreement situation to be more intense, resulting in a higher likelihood of vote switching. 
Consequently, the hypothesis is as follows: 
 
H5: Disagreement in the family will exert a stronger effect on the likelihood of changing vote choice 
than will disagreement within nonfamilial social circles. 
 
The Case of the 2014 European Elections in Italy and Influence in a Pre–Post Design 
 
In the present study, we test influence and selection strategies by employing data from the 2014 
European elections, which are organized in a pre- and postelection design (i.e., data in t0 were collected 
shortly before the elections, and data in t1 were collected shortly after the elections). The 2014 elections 
in Italy, however, were held in specific political circumstances, which could affect our results. 
 
The election climate was deeply characterized by the figure of Matteo Renzi, secretary of the 
Democratic Party (Partito Democratico, PD), who had assumed the office of prime minister three months 
before the 2014 elections. The European elections, held in Italy on May 25, 2014, represented the first 
electoral test for Renzi and his government’s political project (Bordignon, 2014). The results of the 
elections were overwhelming. The PD obtained 40.8% of the valid votes, the highest ever share of votes 
for an Italian party in a European election (Maggini, 2014). Compared with the previous national elections 
(which were held a year before, in 2013), the PD gained about 2.5 million votes. This is an even stronger 
result if we consider that the turnout in the European elections was lower than that in the national 
elections (17 percentage points lower than in 2013). The PD surpassed its main competitors, the 
Movimento Cinque Stelle (Five Star Movement) and the center-right coalition (which both lost about 1.5 
million votes). According to the polls, before the “electoral blackout,”2 the PD was strongly predicted to be 
the first party (with an average of 32.3% of the vote share); however, no one predicted such a landslide 
victory.3 
 
Table 1 presents pre- and postelectoral wave percentage data collected by ITANES 2014 for 
parties who passed the 4% threshold (and thus obtained members of the European Parliament).4 The PD 
                                                 
2 According to Italian law, no poll can be published less than two weeks before Election Day. 
3 The average of the PD’s share of votes, predicted by pollsters, is calculated here by considering four polls 
that were conducted (and published) in the last available week (March 6–9). The selected polls were 
conducted by IPR Marketing, Tecné, EMG, and Demopolis, mainly for use on political TV shows and in 
newspapers. For more information, see http://www.sondaggipoliticoelettorali.it  
4 The ITANES data come from a commercial online community, from which names and e-mail addresses 
were randomly selected. Our variables, particularly those related to vote choice, are thus not 
representative of the Italian population. However, the biases are systematic across both waves. Reported 
changes in behaviors and attitudes across different waves of the panel, which are our main concern, can 
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gained the most from the first to the second wave (4.4 percentage points, see Table 1). The impressive 
performance of the party during the 2014 elections could have led people to misreport their actual vote 
choice, which is consistent with a “post-electoral survey bandwagon” effect (Crow, Bowler, & Johnson, 2010). 
 
Table 1. Unweighted Survey Percentages of Declared Vote Choice  
Pre- and Postwave and Differences (in %) for Relevant Parties. 
 
Presurvey 
(N = 2,170) 
Postsurvey 
(N = 2,073) 
Pre–post difference 
(%) 
Partito Democratico 34.8 39.2 4.4 
Movimento Cinque Stelle 23.9 22.8 −0.9 
Forza Italia 13.2 10.9 −2.3 
Nuovo Centrodestra 3.5 2.9 −0.6 
Lega Nord 6.5 7.7 1.2 
Fratelli d’Italia 3.8 3.5 −0.2 
L’altra Europa con Tsipras 8.5 8.8 0.3 
Other parties 5.8 4.2 −1.6 
Source: ITANES, 2014). 
 
Several psychological mechanisms can be considered in order to explain this behavior. According 
to the “spiral of silence” explanation, people might be less inclined to reveal their voting behavior if 
electoral outcomes did not validate their expectations (Atkeson, 1999; Carsey & Jackson, 2001; Noelle-
Neuman, 1984). In other cases, it has been argued that less sophisticated voters, when asked to recall 
their vote choice, tend to apply their evaluation at the moment of the interview instead of trying to 
recollect the views they held at the time of the election. This failure to provide correct information, which 
is similar to the spiral of silence explanation, effectively leads to a postelectoral bandwagon effect (Wright, 
1993). If misreporting is the result of a cognitive bias detached from the empirical regularities in question, 
then it is expected to add random noise to our correlations, leading to depressed and less statistically 
significant coefficients. To assess whether possible bandwagon effects can affect the statistical significance 
and magnitude of our coefficients, two sets of models (one including the entire sample and one with only 
those who did not change their vote choice in t1 toward the PD) will be fitted and differences in the 
coefficients will be evaluated. 
 
Data, Measurement, and Models 
 
In testing for the effects of selection and influence in Italy during the 2014 European elections, 
our main strategy to explain these two mechanisms was as follows: With regard to selection, we ask 
whether being in agreement with and/or having an intimate discussant in a wave leads the respondent to 
name the same discussant in a subsequent wave. Conversely, with regard to influence, we model 
                                                                                                                                                 
be interpreted in a straightforward way. The interpretation of the trends of the variables of interest can 
thus be considered as genuine even though their absolute levels (averages or proportions) cannot be 
generalized for the Italian population. 
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respondents’ electoral volatility (declaring a vote choice for different parties in different waves) by means 
of disagreement with the discussant. The following subsections present data, variables, and models 
involved in the testing procedure. 
 
Data and Main Variables 
 
The 2014 pre- and postelectoral surveys were subsequent waves of a longer panel, which 
comprised a pre-electoral rolling cross-section data set collected before the 2013 national elections (N = 
8,723) and a postelectoral follow-up, which was collected after the same round of voting (N = 3,008). The 
design of the 2014 survey was a pre–post panel (Schadee et al., 2010). The data from the first wave were 
collected from May 9 to May 19, 2014, and the subsequent wave of data was collected from June 10 to 
June 18, 2014 (European elections in Italy were held on May 25, 2014). The interview surveys were 
conducted via the Computer Assisted Web Interview method. In the pre-electoral wave, 3,244 
respondents were interviewed; in the post-electoral survey, 2,599 people agreed to be recontacted, with a 
reinterview rate of 80.1%. This rate is much higher than the average for these types of panels in Italy; for 
instance, the reinterview rate in the 2006 ITANES pre–post panel was around 70% (Bellucci & Maraffi, 
2008). In each wave, as shown in Table 1, respondents were asked to provide information regarding their 
voting behavior (i.e., the party that they were going to vote for in the pre-electoral wave and their actual 
choice in the post-electoral study).5 
 
As noted, we test the selection mechanism by modeling the propensity to maintain or discard a 
discussant according to one’s agreement and intimacy with the discussant. ITANES 2014 data contain the 
main discussants’ information. The main discussant is identified as the person with whom the respondent 
has talked the most regarding politics recently. In both the pre- and postelectoral surveys, respondents 
were asked to report the perceived vote choice of their main discussant and the relationship they shared 
(whether they were spouses, relatives, friends, coworkers, or neighbors). 
 
Finally, respondents were asked to provide the initials of the first and last names of their main 
discussants to clearly identify them later. With the initials of the main discussant, “it is possible to trace 
both whether a discussant was named at a later date . . . and how the presence of acknowledged 
disagreement within the dyad changes over time” (Bello & Rolfe, 2014, p. 137). Of course, since only the 
initials were requested, possible biases were not nullified—that is, John Smith in t0 and James Smith in t1 
will be coded as the same person, JS. However, the probability of biases is undoubtedly smaller than it is 
for surveys in which name generators identify only generic information regarding discussants, which can 
be shared by several people in one’s network.6 
                                                 
5 In the subsequent models, only respondents who provided valid vote choices for themselves and their 
discussants were selected (thus, nonvoters and undecided voters were excluded from the analysis). Even 
though we acknowledge that other insightful information could be derived by distinguishing these other 
types of voters, this further comparison would have made the scope of the article too broad to be 
practical. 
6 ITANES data provide information only for a single discussant—the main discussant—whereas other 
contributions rely on up to five people with whom the respondent has a relationship. This tends to 
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With regard to influence, our hypotheses expect a relationship between the disagreement 
experienced in the broader network and the change of vote choice. The most straightforward method in 
the literature to operationalize network disagreement has been to ask respondents about the political 
preferences of a number of discussants (usually up to five) with whom they have engaged. The so-called 
name generator procedures (Huckfeldt et al., 1995; Huckfeldt, Sprague, & Levine, 2000; Klofstad, 
McClurg, & Rolfe, 2009) have been crucial in discovering relationships between networks and have proven 
to be reliable and powerful procedures. However, as Baldassarri (2009) notes, because name generator 
procedures focus on a few individuals who represent a sort of inner circle of a political discussion network, 
they systematically disregard the political views and attitudes of a person’s broader social network, which 
usually comprises more than three or five discussants. It is thus necessary to obtain a measure of 
disagreement within different social circles instead of among discussants. When facing such an issue, 
name generator procedures become more problematic; for instance, they could result in noncohesive 
groups’ information being systematically underreported because the people who constitute these groups 
are, by definition, individually less “important” than those who belong to cohesive groups (Baldassarri, 
2009; Huckfeldt et al., 1995). Conversely, the importance of stronger relationships is overestimated. The 
solution proposed in this study accounts for this possible bias by employing another measure. The two 
questions that were asked in the 2013 and 2014 ITANES surveys are a variation of the theme of those 
originally presented7 and read as follows: 
 
1. How many of the members of your family do you think share your political opinion? 
a. None of them (0%) 
b. A few of them (around 10%) 
c. Some of them (around 25%) 
d. About half of them (around 50%) 
e. Many of them (around 75%) 
f. Most of them (around 90%) 
g. All of them (100%) 
 
2. Now let’s think about your friends: How many of them do you think share your 
political opinion? 
a. None of them (0%) 
b. A few of them (around 10%) 
c. Some of them (around 25%) 
d. About half of them (around 50%) 
                                                                                                                                                 
underestimate the possibility of finding significant selection processes. This problem will be addressed in 
greater detail in the last section of the article. 
7 Although the questions proposed by Baldassarri (2009) explicitly asked for a rough percentage of the 
number of people who voted for a certain party or coalition, in the 2013 and 2014 surveys, it was decided 
that respondents would be asked for an estimate of the number of discussants who shared their political 
opinions. 
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e. Many of them (around 75%) 
f. Most of them (around 90%) 
g. All of them (100%) 
 
This measure allows us to assess how voters were embedded in networks with people who agree 
or disagree with their views. In particular, questions were asked about family members and circles of 
friends (which are assumed, respectively, to be characterized by stronger and weaker ties). Appendix A 




To analyze the selection mechanism, we employ logistic regression models and base the analysis 
on assessing whether the dyadic relationship between a respondent and his or her discussant persists 
along the two waves. Following Bello and Rolfe (2014), the most promising candidate for the dependent 
variable is constructed to be equal to 1 when the respondent indicates the same discussant in both the 
waves, and 0 otherwise. The discussant’s initials are used to determine whether the discussants are the 
same in both waves. 
 
The first hypothesis (H1) related to the selection process expects that if selection mechanisms 
contribute to shape respondents’ network composition, then people in the first wave who share the 
respondent’s views are more likely to be retained in the subsequent wave. Perceived agreement between 
the respondent and his or her discussant is thus the main predictor, and it is constructed by comparing 
vote choices of respondents and their discussants in the pre-electoral wave. Second, H2 states that 
discussants belonging to closer social circles (e.g., the family) should present higher retention levels (i.e., 
it is more difficult to discard a relative than a neighbor). Finally, what happens to selection when a 
respondent deals with a discussant who is both intimate and of a different political opinion (H3)? Model 2 
provides an interaction between perceived disagreement and the circle to which the main discussant 
belongs. To control for an alternative explanation of our dependent variable, we add a measure of political 
involvement (a 4-point scale of knowledge concerning European issues) and a measure of partisanship (a 
4-point scale of party identification strength).8 To avoid endogeneity issues, all the variables in the models 
are collected in the first wave. The models to be executed can thus be written as follows: 
 
1. p(INITEQw1w2 = 1) = CONS + DISAGw1 + SOC_CIRw1 + ID_STRENGTHw1 + KNOWLw1 
 
2. p(INITEQw1w2 = 1) = CONS + DISAGw1 + SOC_CIRw1 + DISAGw1*SOC_CIRw1 + 
ID_STRENGTHw1 + KNOWLw1 
 
                                                 
8 Several studies (Bello & Rolfe, 2014; Converse 1966; Zaller, 1992) have hypothesized that political 
involvement and partisanship can lead to a higher likelihood of selection and influence. An additional set of 
models (not shown) has been fitted to control for the possibility of sociodemographic variables affecting 
our results. By adding them to our four logistic models of social class, age, gender, and educational level 
variables, estimates presented in the article do not change in magnitude or significance. 
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Where: 
INITEQw1w2 equals 1 if initialsw1 = initialsw2 and equals 0 if initialsw1 ≠ initialsw2; 
CONS is the constant; 
DISAGw1 is disagreement with discussant in the pre-electoral wave (based on reported 
respondent and discussant vote choices); 
SOC_CIRw1 is the discussant’s social circle in the pre-electoral wave;9 
ID_STRENGTHw1 is a party identification (PID) 4-point scale in which 0 = no PID, 
1 = weak PID, 2 = moderate PID, and 3 = strong PID; and 
KNOWLw1 is the respondent’s political knowledge.10 
 
The analysis of the influence mechanism follows the modeling strategy proposed by Bello and 
Rolfe (2014) and is based on logistic regression models. The binary dependent variable is constructed 
such that it is equal to 1 when the vote choice in Wave 2 is the same as the vote choice declared in Wave 
1, and it is equal to 0 when it differs. Two hypotheses presented earlier (H4 and H5) state that, first, if the 
influence process actually exists, then changes in vote choice are a function of the level of disagreement in 
an individual’s social network; and, second, disagreement in relatives’ circles will exert stronger influence 
than nonrelatives’ ones. This level of disagreement has been operationalized by the synthetic political 
homogeneity measure presented. The measure is originally coded such that 0 means 0% of circle 
agreement, 0.10 means 10% agreement, and so on. The variable’s complement to 1 gives us a measure 
of disagreement in cohesive and noncohesive social groups. 
 
An additional methodological problem concerns possible bandwagon effects that could be caused 
by the unexpected results of the 2014 elections. Matteo Renzi’s PD obtained a result that was about 8 
percentage points higher than pollsters’ expectations. The ITANES data show that the number of 
respondents who had declared a PD vote increased by 4.4 percentage points in the postelectoral wave. If 
an actual postelectoral misreporting problem can be recognized in the data, then the respondents who had 
switched to voting for the PD in the postelectoral wave are most likely to have misreported their actual 
vote choice because of the bandwagon effect. In this study, we circumvent this problem by removing, in a 
separate model, respondents who changed their declared vote choice in favor of the PD in the second 
wave. The assumption behind this choice is strong—by removing the group of PD switchers, we are 
assuming that the entire group is subject to some form of bandwagon effect (which clearly cannot be 
true). This decision, however, although trenchant, permits us to check whether our coefficients are 
impinged on by possible forms of cognitive bias. In particular, our technical expectation is that coefficients 
                                                 
9 The original question concerning the main discussant’s circle had seven response categories, which have 
been recoded into two categories: partner and other relatives were recoded into relative, friend, 
workmate, and neighbor; and other person has been recoded as nonrelative. Throughout the article, the 
term relatives refers to members of the family plus the partner. 
10 The ITANES 2014 data contained three knowledge questions related to European Union topics: the 
number of European Union members; the name of the candidate for president of the European 
Commission from the Popular Party; and the candidate from the Socialist Party. A 0–3 scale was 
formulated, in which 3 equals having answered all three questions correctly and 0 equals having answered 
all three questions incorrectly. 
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are likely to be depressed and standard errors could be larger because of misreporting issues (with 
misreporting adding random noise to our models). 
The two models will be fitted as follows: 
 
3. p(DIFFVOTEw1w2 = 1) = CONS + FAMNET_Dw2 + FRINET_Dw2 + ID_STRENGTHw1 + 
KNOWLw1 
 
4. p(DIFFVOTEw1w2 = 1) = CONS + FAMNET_Dw2 + FRINET_Dw2 + ID_STRENGTHw1 + 
KNOWLw1 if VOTEPDw2 = 0 
 
Where: 
DIFFVOTEw1w2 equals 1 if votechoicew1 ≠ votechoicew2 and equals 0 if votechoicew1 = 
votechoicew2;; 
CONS is the constant; 
FAMNET_Dw2 is a measure of the overall disagreement with relatives11; 
FRINET_Dw2 is a measure of the overall disagreement with friends;11 
ID_STRENGTHw1 is a 4-point scale of PID strength (defined above); 
KNOWLw1 is respondent’s political knowledge; and 





We begin by presenting the results for the formal test of selection (H1, H2 and H3). Table 2 
shows the coefficients for models 1 and 2. The strength of party identification does not influence the 
likelihood of maintaining a discussant in the subsequent wave. Political knowledge, however, increases 
propensities to maintain a discussant. This suggests that people who are more involved in political issues 





                                                 
11 Unfortunately, the data at our disposal did not collect information on networks’ overall agreement in the 
pre-electoral wave. This could raise questions concerning the endogeneity of the predictor. However, we 
can reasonably respond to such a concern by assuming that changes in a whole network (or at least in 
respondents’ perceptions about this network) can be expected to be weak and that our self-reported 
variable is relatively stable over time. To enhance the empirical working of the variable and to test our 
hypotheses with stronger constraints, Appendix B presents the same set of models for the influence 
process, which was fitted using the overall disagreement variable measures on the same individuals, 
which in turn, were collected during the 2013 national elections (i.e., more than one year before the two 
waves considered). Assessing the data as far as possible, we find that even if significance levels are 
weaker, no substantive differences emerge from this new set of models. 
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Table 2. Logistic Regression Models for the Study of  
Naming the Same Discussant in Wave 2. 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 No interaction Dyadic interaction 
Regressors Coefficient SE Coefficient SE 
Political knowledge 0.19*** 0.05 0.19*** 0.06 
Party identification strength (ref: 
not partisan) 
    
Weak 0.30 0.33 0.32 0.33 
Moderate 0.30 0.32 0.31 0.32 
Strong  0.13 0.33 0.15 0.33 
Discussant (ref: relative)     
Nonrelative −1.00*** 0.11 −1.17*** 0.13 
Disagreement in Wave 1 −0.18 0.15 −0.67*** 0.22 
Nonrelative × Disagreement   0.88*** 0.29 
Constant −0.10 0.33 −0.05 0.33 
     
Number of observations 1,331 1,331 
Log-likelihood −872.8 −868.2 
*** p < 0.01. 
 
In Model 1, it is possible to see that disagreement in Wave 1 does not lead to a significant change 
in naming the same discussant in Wave 2. Conversely, exposure to a nonrelative discussant in Wave 1 
leads to lower propensities to retain the discussant in Wave 2. This is consistent with the argument made 
earlier that people who are exposed to members of noncohesive social groups tend to dismiss these 
discussants more easily regardless of their political attitudes. Thus, Model 1 tells us that exposure to a 
discussant with whom one disagrees does not lead to selection strategies; however, simultaneously, 
exposure to a nonrelative leads to selection. Our results, thus, seem to disconfirm H1 and corroborate H2. 
What happens when someone is exposed to a discussant who both holds a different political view and is a 
relative? 
 
Model 2, by means of a two-way interaction between the discussant’s social circle and 
disagreement, shows what happens to selection strategies when we consider both these characteristics of 
the main discussant. First, we can see that Model 2 has a better goodness of fit than Model 1 (the 
interaction and the likelihood-ratio test results are both significant). To better understand the empirical 
working of the model, the predicted probabilities for the four combinations of characteristics are presented 
in Figure 1. The likelihood of retaining in a later wave relatives with whom one disagrees and nonrelative 
discussants (both agreeable and disagreeable) is not significantly different from the others. The only 








Figure 1. Predicted probabilities of naming the same discussant in Wave 2,  
conditional on disagreement and social circle (Model 2 coefficients). 
 
In other words, people are more likely to retain discussants with whom they agree and who are 
relatives, and they tend to discard discussants with whom they disagree regardless of the relationship 
they share. This finding conflicts with Bello and Rolfe’s (2014) hypothesis (and with our H3); however, it is 
consistent with the strong family setting argument—a relative with whom one agrees is a close person 
who also shares one’s political views. Consequently, an individual is highly unlikely to discard such a 
discussant. 
 
Table 3 presents the results of our tests of the influence hypotheses presented earlier (H4 and 
H5). The control variables for political knowledge and partisanship strength lead to lower probabilities of 
changing party choice. That means that, consistent with our expectations, people who have stronger 
opinions are less likely to change their minds from the pre-electoral wave to the postelectoral one. Our 
main substantive expectation is that a higher level of disagreement in one’s network would lead to higher 
propensities to switch parties. The coefficients shown in Table 3 indicate that network disagreement leads 
to higher propensities to switch party preferences only with regard to family networks. Disagreement in 
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circles of friends (i.e., our proxy for noncohesive heterogeneity) does not lead to significant changes in the 
likelihood of switching parties. Thus, similar to the positive selection mechanism, our findings stress that 
influence mechanisms are more likely to be discovered among the familial—that is, cohesive—circle.  
 
Table 3. Logistic Regression Models for the Study of Vote Choice Change. 
 Model 3 Model 4 
 Whole sample 
Only non-PD switchers 
in Wave 2 
Regressors Coefficient SE Coefficient SE 
Political knowledge −0.26*** 0.05 −0.31*** 0.06 
Party identification strength (ref: 
not partisan)     
Weak −0.19 0.20 −0.17 0.21 
Moderate −0.41** 0.19 −0.37* 0.21 
Strong  −0.92*** 0.22 −0.84*** 0.23 
Self-reported relatives 
disagreement 0.52** 0.22 0.63*** 0.23 
Self-reported friends disagreement −0.23 0.26 −0.28 0.27 
Constant −0.37 0.23 −0.53** 0.24 
     
Number of observations 1,752 1,684 
Log-likelihood −974.3 −878.1 
* p < 0.1. ** p < 0.05. *** p < 0.01. 
 
Figure 2 shows the predicted probabilities for the two main predictors. The left panel shows that 
family disagreement leads to higher propensities to switch parties—on the order of 11 percentage points 
(from 0.22 to 0.33). Conversely, the right panel shows that disagreement within circles of friends does not 
lead to significant differences in the probabilities of dependent variables (even though the slope is 
negative, standard errors are large). 
 
Model 4 (see Table 3) removes all the cases that switched to the PD in the postelectoral wave. 
Even though we acknowledge that this is a trenchant technical solution, it is useful to identify the direction 
in which possible misreporting of voting behavior could affect the coefficients. Removing cases from a 
regression model could lead to different outcomes; when we remove cases, we could obtain, with respect 
to the same regression model, larger standard errors and less stable estimates. As stated earlier, 
however, if some of the cases we remove are affected by some kind of cognitive bias, and if the 
theoretical correlation we look for is real, then the coefficients of the purified model should show a clearer 
pattern of results (as we partly delete random noise). Results show that having erased the PD switchers in 
the second wave, the significance and magnitude of the family coefficient rise slightly. This could be 
indirect proof of the fact that part of the group of PD switchers was affected by some sort of postelection 
bandwagon effect. However, the coefficient of the circle of friends remains insignificant. Nevertheless, it 
must be stressed that this latter model does not change our substantive understating of discussion 
network effects that took place in the 2014 elections. 




Figure 2. Predicted probabilities of changing vote choice among different levels of  
relatives’ and friends’ disagreement (Model 3 coefficients). 
 
Conclusion and Discussion 
 
This article evaluates the contribution of two relational mechanisms—influence and selection—in 
forging the political attitudes of individuals embedded in different social circles. The article presents 
several innovative points with respect to the previous literature. First, and most important, the literature 
dealing with politically diverse networks and their consequences in terms of voting behavior has been 
based mostly on American data (Eveland et al., 2015; Hopmann, 2012). At the same time, a sizable 
demographic and sociological literature has demonstrated that Italians (and Southern Europeans in 
general) rely more on their relatives in many aspects of their life, thus presenting a social structure in 
which the family is more important than it is in other countries (Guetto et al., 2016; Reher, 1998). Our 
findings indicate that even in political relations, the family has a role in shaping mechanisms forging 
political agreement. More precisely, the coercive effect of the family is stronger in our case study than it is 
in other studies that consider the Anglo-American context. 
 
In line with previous literature (Bello & Rolfe, 2014), evidences of selection (among the whole 
sample) were not found. More precisely, disagreement with any discussant in t0 does not lead the 
individual to discard this discussant in t1. This does not mean, however, that it is impossible to find any 
selection processes whatsoever. A relevant and significant effect of positive selection was found, though 
only among people who were exposed to a family member as discussant. In other words, people tend to 
maintain discussants who share the same political view and only if they are relatives. Even though this 
result is, in principle, quite straightforward, it contrasts with the work of Bello and Rolfe (2014), who 
demonstrated that, in the United Kingdom, people tend to remain familiar with those they disagree with. 
On the contrary, the result is fairly consistent with the expectations that see the family as a strong agent 
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of political coercion (Huckfeldt & Sprague, 1995). In particular, a comparison between our results and the 
evidence collected by Bello and Rolfe suggests that the differences emerging in the studies could result 
from the different family settings that rule in the two contexts. 
 
With regard to the influence process, our findings indicate that, as expected from previous works, 
disagreement in the social network, which is measured by the overall judgment of the disagreement level 
in a network, leads to a higher likelihood of switching vote choices in the subsequent wave. Again, it is 
important to stress the role of the family, which is revealed to be the environment in which strategies to 
reach political agreement are enacted. This result suggests that in more intimate social circles, 
disagreement among Italians is less sustainable than it is in circles that are characterized by weaker ties. 
 
By removing respondents who switched to support the PD (to consider the bandwagon effect) 
from the analysis, the results remain the same, and we see a marginal rise in the statistical significance 
and the magnitude of the familial disagreement effect, as expected. Possible misreporting due to the 
bandwagon effect thus impinges only marginally on our coefficients, and our substantive interpretations 
remain unaltered. Even though the two models shown in Table 3 are practically identical, this additional 
control shows us that, at least in a weak way, what happens between the two waves of a panel, 
particularly in a time of dense political stimuli such as an election campaign, could affect our results and 
must be considered carefully. 
 
This study also presents several limitations. Even though we demonstrated that Italians’ behavior 
presents different results than other sociopolitical contexts, it is not yet clear whether the strong/weak 
family distinction holds true in more than two European contexts. For this reason, a broader comparative 
perspective, with more data collected in various contexts, should be employed to test influence and 
selection hypotheses more systematically (as suggested by Hopmann et al., 2015). In addition, it is 
important to underline that the limited pool of discussion partners, combined with the small time span for 
which data are available, led us to expect that the effects of the influence and selection processes are 
largely underestimated. For instance, with regard to selection mechanism tests, collecting data on a small 
number of discussants in a survey led to more people reporting that they had changed their discussant (in 
fact, respondents could have simply chosen another discussant in t1 as their main discussant while 
continuing to have relations with the former reported in t0). More refined data, such as longer longitudinal 
data sets with information on more discussion partners, would help us to address questions that this and 
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Table A1. Descriptive Statistics for Variables Included in Tables 2 and 3. 
 Table 2 
descriptive 
statistics 








Variables M SD M SD M SD 
Dependent variables       
Same initials in Waves 1 and 2 0.48 0.50     
Respondent changed vote in Wave 2   0.26 0.44 0.23 0.42 
       
Main predictors       
Disagreement in Wave 1 0.20 0.40     
Relative discussant 0.52 0.50     
Nonrelative discussant 0.48 0.50     
Self-reported relatives disagreement   0.42 0.30 0.42 0.30 
Self-reported friends disagreement   0.50 0.25 0.50 0.25 
       
Controls       
Political knowledge 1.58 1.05 1.54 1.06 1.54 1.06 
Party identification strength: not 
partisan 0.04 0.18 0.08 0.28 0.08 0.27 
Party identification strength: Weak 0.29 0.45 0.28 0.45 0.28 0.45 
Party identification strength: 
Moderate 0.43 0.49 0.41 0.49 0.41 0.49 
Party identification strength: Strong 0.25 0.43 0.23 0.42 0.23 0.42 
       
N 1,331 1,752 1,684 
 





The self-reported overall disagreement variables presented in Table 3 are measured in the 
second wave. Measuring these predictors in the same wave as the dependent variable could raise 
concerns regarding endogeneity. To address this potential issue, it has been argued that the overall 
judgment of disagreement in a whole social circle should be sufficiently stable to dispel questions of 
endogeneity. Table B1 presents an additional piece of evidence. Relatives’ and friends’ disagreement 
variables were collected in 2013—more than a year before the collection of the dependent variable.  
 
Table B1. Logistic Regression Models for the Study of Vote Choice Change. 
 Whole sample Only non-PD switchers 
in Wave 2 
Regressors Coefficient SE Coefficient SE 
     
Political knowledge −0.25*** 0.05 −0.28*** 0.06 
Party strength (ref: not partisan)     
Weak −0.18 0.20 −0.20 0.21 
Moderate −0.40** 0.19 −0.40** 0.20 
Strong  −0.85*** 0.22 −0.82*** 0.23 
Self-reported relatives disagreement 
(2013) 
0.39 0.24 0.44* 0.25 
Self-reported friends disagreement 
(2013) 
−0.17 0.26 −0.10 0.27 
Constant −0.41* 0.21 −0.56** 0.22 
     
Number of observations 1,802 1,740 
Log-likelihood  −989.9  −900.9 
* p < 0.1. ** p < 0.05. *** p < 0.01. 
 
We must stress that the relations between the dependent variable on one side and the main 
substantive regressors on the other are partially compromised by the dramatically different political 
situations in which the two variables were collected (the dependent variable was collected during a 
second-order election and the independent regressor during a first-order election—that is, in very different 
political circumstances). We are thus conscious that employing such “old” variables adds some noise to 
the coefficients shown in Table B1. Despite these issues, the signs of the coefficients in the two models 
displayed in Table B1 are consistent with the results reported in Table 3, and the magnitudes of the effects 
are roughly similar. The significance of the relatives’ disagreement coefficient approaches 10% in the first 
model (p-value is 0.103), and it is firmly significant at the 10% level in the second model, in which 
potential misreporters in 2014 are excluded. In summary, it is possible to conclude that the models 
presented in Table B1 and Table 3 are substantially interpretable in an equivalent way. 
 
 
